This paper estimated the effects of tort law and insurer investment returns on physician malpractice insurance premiums. Data were collected on tort law from 1991 through 2004, and multivariate regression models, including fixed effects for state and year, were used to estimate the effect of changes in tort law on medical malpractice premiums. The premium consequences of national policy changes were simulated. The analysis found that the introduction of a new damage cap lowered malpractice premiums for internal medicine, general surgery, and obstetrics/gynecology by 17.3%, 20.7%, and 25.5%, respectively. Lowering damage caps by $100,000 reduced premiums by 4%. Statutes of repose also resulted in lower premiums. No other tort law changes had the effect of lowering premiums. Simulation results indicate that a national cap of $250,000 on awards for noneconomic damages in all states would imply premium savings of $16.9 billion. Extending a $250,000 cap to all states that do not currently have them would save $1.4 billion annually, or about 8% of the total. A negative effect on malpractice premiums was found for the Dow Jones industrial average, but not for bond prices; effects of the Nasdaq index were not significant for internal medicine, but were marginally significant for surgery and obstetrics premiums.
Physician malpractice insurance is once again a serious concern for health care providers, payers, and consumers. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS 2002b) estimated that malpractice premiums increased by 73% between 1999 and 2002. The Medical Liability Monitor (2005) reported that physician liability premiums increased between 10% and 49% in 2003 10% and 49% in and between 6.9% and 24.9% in 2004 10% and 49% in . In 2003 alone, some 34 states debated malpractice reform (Madigan 2003) . President Bush has repeatedly asked Congress to enact legislation capping noneconomic damages in malpractice cases at $250,000 (White House 2005) and the House of Representatives has passed such a bill in seven of the last 10 years. Physicians and insurers attribute premium increases to more frequent and costly malpractice awards (Palmisano 2005) .
Others blame premium increases on falling asset prices and mismanagement on the part of insurers (Treaster and Brinkley 2005) .
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it estimates the effects of changes in state tort law on medical malpractice premiums over the 1991-2004 period. Of particular interest, it estimates a ''dose-response'' effect for inflation-adjusted values of damage caps. Second, it examines the effect of investment returns on malpractice premiums.
Background
The United States appears to be in its third medical malpractice ''crisis'' since the 1970s. The first, in the 1974-1976 period, was a ''crisis of availability.'' Faced with increasing claims and a recession, many insurers left the malpractice market and others instituted rate increases as high as 500%. In response, physicians formed mutual insurance companies, some states formed joint underwriting associations and/or patient compensation funds, and insurers were allowed to move to claims-made coverage under which insurers were liable only for those claims filed during the coverage period (Danzon 1985) . Several states enacted changes in malpractice tort law, such as California's 1975 statute that capped awards for noneconomic damages at $250,000 (California Civil Code 2005) .
The second crisis, running from approximately 1984 to 1986, has been characterized as a ''crisis of affordability.'' This crisis involved a general rise in liability claims for a variety of insurance types. Physician mutual insurance plans made availability less of an issue, but increasing frequency and magnitude of claims threatened their solvency. Again, insurance products were restructured, but state-level tort reforms were more general rather than targeted at malpractice issues. Legislation was enacted to reduce the frequency of claims, to lower the amounts recoverable, and to reduce the costs of the legal process (see Danzon 1985 and Githerns 1991 for in-depth discussion of these crises).
In the current ''crisis,'' after years of relative stability, malpractice premiums have risen substantially since 2001. Again, physicians, attorneys, policymakers, and other interested parties are discussing what to do; further changes in tort law have been proposed. A tort is a civil wrong not involving a breach of contract. Tort law establishes the rules through which judicial institutions assess damages, determine liability, and provide compensation to those harmed by the tortuous acts of others. For example, if a health care provider causes harm to a patient through negligence, the provider has committed a tort.
Despite substantial changes in health care markets with the rise of managed care, there has been little rigorous analysis of how tort law has affected malpractice premiums since the late 1980s and early 1990s. Meanwhile, the economy has gone through rapid growth and recession, and states have enacted new malpractice reforms. As Congress and the states debate legislation, it is important to have a rigorous analysis of the current environment to identify any effects that may result from changes in the law.
Nature of Tort Reforms
Since the mid-1970s there have been a number of tort reforms enacted by the states. We focus on 11 major provisions.
Damage caps. Damage caps are the most wellknown reforms. Plaintiffs in malpractice cases will typically seek to recover economic damages such as medical costs and the opportunity cost of lost income. In addition, they also typically seek noneconomic damages (e.g., for pain and suffering) and, in some cases, punitive damages. Damage caps limit the magnitude of damages that are recoverable. Some apply only to noneconomic damages, while others apply to both economic and noneconomic compensatory damages. Others apply only to punitive damages. The rationale for damage caps is that they will directly limit the award and thereby lower malpractice premiums. There is also a view that the limitation on awards will reduce the incidence of suits as well.
Usually the cap is stated in nominal terms, such as $250,000 per claim. Over time, such nominal caps become more restrictive as inflation erodes the purchasing power of any given value. For example, the $250,000 limit on noneconomic damages imposed in California in 1975 is the equivalent in purchasing power to an $877,800 limit in 2004 dollars. Thus, the cap is much more restrictive today than when it was enacted. Some states have put in place automatic adjustments to their damage caps, linked to such things as average earnings in the state. Other state legislatures have revisited the caps from time to time and adjusted their magnitude.
Collateral source offset. A plaintiff may incur substantial medical costs as a result of negligent medical treatment and may sue to recover these costs. Under common law, the plaintiff was entitled to recover the costs incurred even though they were reimbursed by another source such as health insurance. Many states now have modified the common law by adopting rules that typically reduce any award for medical expenses by the amount recovered from other sources. Thus if the plaintiff's health insurance plan paid those expenses, then the plaintiff would have any award reduced by the amount of those payments. Some states allow collateral sources to be considered by the jury and some require that the awards be reduced by the judge to reflect collateral offsets. The purpose is to reduce the magnitude of any award, resulting in lower malpractice insurance premiums.
Modification of the rule of joint and several liability. A plaintiff may sue the physician, hospital, and nurse associated with some procedure. Under case law in most states, each of the defendants would be liable for the entire award if the other defendants were unable to pay. Many states have enacted provisions that limit each defendant's liability to only his or her share of the wrongdoing. This again has as its purpose the lowering of the magnitude of the award attributable to any one party. This in turn could lower malpractice premiums.
Periodic payments. Typically, under common law when a plaintiff wins a lawsuit, the defendant is responsible for payment of the entire award in a lump sum at the time of the entry of judgment, including future damages that are reduced to present value. Provisions for periodic payment allow the defendant to spread out payments over some legislative or court-determined schedule. The rationale for this provision is that it allows the defendant to save money by comparing the present value of the payment schedule with the present value of alternative payment or financing arrangements and selecting the least costly. There is some speculation, however, that such provisions may increase net payments if the plaintiff has higher than expected medical expenses downstream.
Statutes of limitation and repose. Statutes of limitation specify a limited time period from occurrence or discovery of an allegedly tortuous act to the filing of a claim in court. With the exception of cases involving children, malpractice statutes of limitations are typically about two years, but the time for filing suit may run from the time of occurrence or discovery in most jurisdictions. Statutes of repose go further and limit the absolute amount of time one has to file a claim regardless of when discovery occurred. These provisions typically impose a limit of three to four years. The purpose of a statute of repose is to narrow the time window during which a claim may be filed, thereby reducing the number of claims and reducing premiums.
Limits on attorney fees. Most malpractice cases are handled on a contingency basis. The plaintiff is responsible for the costs of the suit and if victorious, the plaintiff's attorney is entitled to a share of the award. Contingency fees in malpractice cases may be as high as 50%. Some states, however, have enacted limits on the percentage of the award that may be paid to the attorney; others have provided for judicial oversight of the payment with respect to its reasonableness. The rationale is that by limiting the attorney's fee, frivolous lawsuits will be reduced, thereby lowering premiums. There was no change in legislation dealing with attorney fees during our period of analysis, so we were unable to examine its impact.
Limitations on experts. A malpractice case typically requires a medical expert to testify that some event occurred that did not meet the standard of care. Some states have enacted provisions that specify the requisite credentials of clinicians eligible to be qualified as experts in a malpractice case. The laws often require that a physician be board certified in the same specialty as the defendant, and/or that he/she be in active practice deriving some relatively large percentage of income from clinical practice during a specified period of time prior to qualifying as an expert. The intent is to limit the ability of a plaintiff to ''doctor shop'' for experts willing to testify regardless of their knowledge of the local standard of care or their familiarity with the procedure. The law's intent is to reduce the number of unsubstantiated claims, and raise the costs of bringing a suit with the result that malpractice premiums are reduced.
Res ipsa loquitur. Some iatrogenic injuries have been held to constitute malpractice on their very face under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This allows the plaintiff's claim to go to the jury without specifying the negligent conduct of the defendant physician. Res ipsa loquitur traditionally has been invoked successfully in cases where a foreign object is left in the body following surgery, or where an injury occurs to a part of the body distant from the intended site of surgery. Courts in some states have broadened the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur beyond these traditional cases. A few states have reacted by adopting statutes limiting the range of results that may be covered by res ipsa loquitur. The rationale is that limiting the application of res ipsa loquitur raises the costs of pursuing a claim, thereby lowering the frequency of claims and reducing premiums. Here, too, there was no change in legislation over our analysis period, so we were unable to judge its impact.
Pre-trial screening. In the 1980s, approximately one-third of the states enacted legislation that required the parties to submit their claim to a panel of experts that would render an opinion on whether the claim was meritorious. In some states this finding could be used in court; in most it could not. The rationale for the process was that the screening would serve as a low-cost means of identifying weak or unsubstantiated claims. A plaintiff with a weak case would be more likely to drop the case. Those claims found to have merit would be more likely to settle without going to court, thereby lowering litigation costs. The effect was expected to be fewer claims and more settlements without the costs of trial, with the intent that premiums would be reduced. There was no change in the number of states with pre-trial screening over the 1991-2004 period.
Arbitration. Subscribers purchase health insurance from an insurer. Some health insurers include a clause in their contracts requiring subscribers to accept binding arbitration in the event of an allegedly negligent act. In addition, some health care providers may require a patient to sign an agreement to arbitrate malpractice claims prior to providing treatment. Some states have enacted legislation treating pre-claim agreements to arbitrate as binding. The rationale is that the use of this alternative resolution process is likely to be a less costly means of settlement and, as a consequence, malpractice premiums would be lower.
Studies of Malpractice Premiums
There have been a number of recent studies of the effects of tort reforms on medical malpractice premiums. DHHS (2002a) Reform (2004) used national data trends to argue that there had been no explosion of malpractice payouts at any time in the past 30 years. It attributes increases in premiums to the state of the economy and declining investment income for insurers. These and similar studies, however, are not reliable guides to understanding the effects of tort reforms on malpractice premiums. They do not control for other factors that may have been going on nationally and they fail to control for systematic differences in the states that may also account for differences in the observed premiums.
In contrast, there have been nearly a dozen studies that have attempted to identify the effects of tort reforms that do control for national and state trends using a variety of different data sets (see Nelson, Kilgore and Morrisey 2006 for a review).
In the earliest work, Sloan (1985) used a Health Care Financing Administration Survey of Insurers to examine the effects of damage caps on the average malpractice premiums paid by general practitioners, orthopedic surgeons and ophthalmologists across states; he found no statistically significant effects over the 1974 -1978 period. Zuckerman, Bovbjerg, and Sloan (1990 extended this work through 1986, carefully coding the nature and timing of the laws enacted and using lagged premiums, state fixed effects, and a time trend to control for differences across states and over time. They concluded that damage caps on general surgeons, general practitioners, and obstetricians reduced short-run premiums by 13.4%, 14.3%, and 16.9%, respectively. Longrun premium decreases ranged from 40.6% to 57.9%. They attributed the lack of findings in the Sloan (1985) work to the short period of analysis. Blackmon and Zeckhauser (1990) were the first to examine aggregate state malpractice premium data. Unlike Zuckerman, Bovbjerg, and Sloan, who essentially examined the price of coverage as observed by the average physician in a given specialty, this study explored the effects of reforms on aggregate malpractice premium income received by insurers in the state, using a model that included a lagged premium variable. Using data from Best's Review, Blackmon and Zeckhauser estimated the change in premium income between 1985 and 1988 as a function of a dummy variable indicating that a state implemented reforms in 1986. They found that states that implemented the four reforms analyzed reduced aggregate short-run premium income by 16.6%. Viscusi et al. (1993) expanded and refined the Blackmon and Zeckhauser study, focusing on reforms in 1985, 1986, and 1987 . They concluded that states enacting some sort of ''reform'' in 1985 or 1986 reduced the increase in premium income by 27.7% and 21.4% respectively; however, an examination of specific reforms found no statistically significant effects of damage caps. Gius (1998) also used Best's state aggregate data, but over the 1976 to 1990 period. With the introduction of a random effects specification, he too found no statistically significant effect of damage caps on aggregate premiums. While aggregate premium income is an important gauge of performance, these analyses were unable to identify whether any effects were driven (or offset) by changes in premiums, in the volume of coverage written, in the mix of specialties represented, or in the mix of insurers providing the coverage over the period. Viscusi and Born (1995) improved on the aforementioned aggregate premium work by using National Association of Insurance Commissioner (NAIC) data to examine the effects of reforms on malpractice premium income by firm by year. These data, available over the 1985-1991 period, allowed them to estimate state and year fixed-effects premium income equations. They concluded that states enacting ''reforms'' reduced firm-specific aggregate premiums by 12.4%. In models that excluded fixed effects, ceilings on recoveries reduced aggregate premiums by 8%. Viscusi and Born (2004) revisited these data and employed more detailed characterizations of the state malpractice reforms. They concluded that states with caps on noneconomic damages reduced short-run premium income by 6.2% and those that prohibited punitive damages reduced short-run premium income by 8.1%. The long-run effects were 19.7% and 25.8%, respectively. Thorpe (2004) also used the NAIC data but over a much longer time period: 1985 through 2001. He used the Blackmon and Zeckhauser approach of examining state aggregate premium income, but added a new measure-the aggregate premium income per physician in the state. Year fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable were included in the specification. Thorpe found that states with either economic or noneconomic damage caps (or both) had aggregate premium incomes that were 17.1% lower and premium income per physician that was 12.2% lower. There was no statistically significant effect of prohibitions on punitive damages.
Unlike the other studies, Kessler and McClellan (1997) used a survey of physician self-reported malpractice premiums. As such, their work is in the spirit of that of Zuckerman, Bovbjerg, and Sloan (1990) in examining the price of coverage from the physician perspective. They employ a full state and year fixed-effects model to account for differences across time and across states. ''Direct reforms,'' essentially damage caps, were found to reduce premiums by 8.4% three years after enactment.
Finally, Danzon, Epstein, and Johnson (2004) used Medical Liability Monitor data to also study the effects of tort reforms on premiums from the physician's perspective. They have 1994-2003 data on average annual premiums paid by internists, general surgeons, and obstetricians by firm and state. Using a state and year fixed-effects model they found that noneconomic damage caps below $500,000 reduced the change in premiums by 5.7%. Damage caps set at a higher level, and total damage caps had no statistically significant effects.
While these carefully conducted studies differ substantially in their findings, much of this has to do with their unit of analysis. The studies that differ the most are those that examine statelevel aggregate premium income. Gius (1998) found no effects of limits on liability. Blackmon and Zeckhauser (1990) found that damage caps reduced short-run premiums by 13%. Thorpe (2004) found that damage caps reduced premium income by 17.1%. Viscusi et al. (1993) found ''reforms'' enacted in 1985 or 1986 reduced aggregate premium income by 27.7% and 21.4%, respectively, but damage caps had no statistically significant effects in other specifications. This wide range perhaps may be explained by different measures of tort reform, different time frames (Gius and Thorpe) and, in the case of Gius, the use of random effects modeling.
The two Born (1995, 2004) studies use insurer-specific aggregate premiums and are much more consistent. ''Reforms'' reduced average premium income by 12.4% (Viscusi and Born 1995) , and damage caps reduced them by 6.2% (Viscusi and Born 2004) . This difference could be attributable to differences in the measures of tort reform used.
Similarly, with the exception of the early Sloan (1985) study that was probably of too short a duration to find meaningful results, the studies that looked at malpractice premiums from a physician's perspective are remarkably consistent. This is particularly so given that they each examined different malpractice ''crisis'' periods. Zuckerman, Bovbjerg, and Sloan (1990) concluded that damage caps over the 1974-1986 period reduced premiums by 13% to 17% in the short run depending on specialty. Kessler and McClellan (1997) found that ''direct reforms'' (essentially damage caps) reduced premiums by 8.4% over the 1985 -1993 period. And Danzon, Epstein, and Johnson (2004 reported that damage caps of $500,000 or less reduced average premiums by 5.7% over the 1994-2003 period.
The evidence that other tort reforms have been effective has been spotty at best. Zuckerman, Bovbjerg, and Sloan (1990) found that shorter discovery periods reduced premiums. Danzon, Epstein, and Johnson (2004) found that the absence of joint and several liability reduced premiums. The other studies either found no additional reform effects or lumped various reforms together.
Data and Methods
We addressed the specific objectives as follows. First, we took advantage of variations in tort law among the states to estimate the effects of different tort law provisions on physician malpractice premiums. We examined these relationships in naïve, state-only, and full fixedeffects models using data from 1991 through 2004. The principal analyses included fixed state and year effects to control for unobserved factors affecting malpractice costs in different states and times that may be unrelated to differences in tort law provisions. We also tested the hypothesis that economic conditions, and returns on investments, affect the costs of malpractice insurance. To do this, it was necessary to relax the year fixed effects to include national economic conditions.
Data on Malpractice Law
Unfortunately, not all the sources agree about what the state laws are or when they were enacted or went in effect (McCullough, Campbell, and Lane 2003; Weiss, Gannon, and Eakins 2003) . We undertook an independent study of the statute and case law related to malpractice liability in each of the states from 1975 onward. A team of law students supervised by a law professor prepared historical summaries of tort law in each of the states. Statutes and judicial opinions were read to determine precisely when tort reforms came into, or went out of, effect. For example, Illinois enacted a $500,000 damage cap in March 1995, but it was declared unconstitutional in December 1997.
We examined laws and court actions on all 11 of the tort law provisions described previously. A coding scheme was developed including dichotomous variables for most provisions, number of years for statutes of limitations and repose, and dollar amounts for caps on noneconomic damage awards. The summaries were reviewed and variables coded independently by each of the authors for every state. Where there were discrepancies in coding, legislation and case law were reviewed and the coding revised accordingly until there was a consensus. The result of these efforts was a thoroughly documented and validated set of codes reflecting the tort provisions that were actually in effect in each state for each year from 1975 through 2004. Table 1 shows the numbers of states that had specific tort provisions in place; Table 2 shows the number of states that made substantive changes in tort laws between 1991 and 2004; and Table 3 gives average values for caps on noneconomic damages and for statutes of limitation and repose. We use one other characteristic of damage caps to observe the effect of the levels of award limitations. Some states set limits in nominal dollars (e.g., California has had a statutory cap of $250,000 since 1975), other states index the caps to some measure of the rate of inflation. We express all award caps (and malpractice insurance premiums) in real 2004 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (All Items). There were 29 states that had damage caps in place at some point between 1991 and 2004; of these, 27 had caps that were not adjusted for inflation. Six states enacted caps during this period; two had caps that were in place prior to 1991 but were subsequently overturned, and two enacted caps after 1991 that were subsequently overturned. Among the 17 states that had caps in place continuously throughout the time period, the average real value was $514,682, and the average standard deviation was $105,514.
Data on Malpractice Premiums
The principal data source for malpractice premiums was the Medical Liability Monitor (MLM 2005) annual survey of physician insurers. Every year, MLM identifies the largest malpractice insurance providers in each state and repeatedly contacts them to provide premium data until all selected providers are accounted for. Except in states with a single provider, MLM reports premiums for between two and seven firms. Data on the market shares of each firm are not made available per agreement with the firms. These data include 1991-2004 state-and substatelevel premiums for three specialties: obstetrics/ gynecology, general surgery, and internal medicine. The intra-state regions were determined by the insurance carriers offering coverage in each of the states; 90 such regions were defined in 1991 and 142 in 2004. State law typically specifies a level of minimum coverage and the prevailing level of coverage is reported; thus we can control for the amount of insurance coverage purchased.
Premium rates for other specialties were estimated based on the resource-based relative value scale (RBRVS) computed by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS 2003) and the frequency of procedure codes billed by each physician specialty from Physician Marketplace Statistics, 1994 -2003 (AMA 1998 . Every billable service that physicians provide is associated with a billing code and assigned relative value units (RVUs) for physician work effort, practice expense, and malpractice expense. We combined malpractice RVU data with billing code distributions by specialty to estimate specific premium rates based on weighted averages of malpractice premiums for the most frequently billed procedures.
Other data sources included: the Area Resource 
Analytic Methods
We estimated three types of models. Type I models used a naïve ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors accounting for observations clustered within states; this has been included to demonstrate how a failure to account for unobserved state characteristics can introduce bias into the parameter estimates. Type II models included state-level fixed effects with a linear time trend. Measures of investment returns are reliable only as national aggregates, and premiums are set annually, so year-level fixed effects could not be used to test the effects of market changes on premiums. Type III models followed the general approach of Kessler and McClellan (1997) in our analysis of the effects of changes in policy on premium rates and estimate equations of the form:
where MP is the natural logarithm of the malpractice premium for specialty r in state-region s in year t. L is the vector of tort laws by state and year, X is a vector of other time-varying market characteristics, u and a are year-and state-fixed effects, respectively, and e is an error term. Tort law is defined at the state level and our unit of observation is the malpractice insurance coverage region; all payment regions are areas within states. Regions change as firms enter, exit, or redefine substate markets; in 1991 there were a total of 78 regions, with 16 states having exactly one region; in 2004 there were 309 regions and only six states were defined as single regions. In all models, robust standard errors were computed, adjusting for clustering of observations within states. State-and year-level fixed-effects regression models effectively controlled for unobserved time-invariant state characteristics and national secular trends that could affect premiums. The regression coefficients on continuous variables can be interpreted as the marginal change in premium rates associated with a within-state change in tort provisions. For the dichotomous tort law changes, we employed the Halverson-Palmquist (1980) correction to obtain the marginal effects.
In addition to presenting the various analytic models described earlier, we offered two different methods for specifying damages caps. The first method included an indicator variable for the presence of a cap in each state and year and a continuous measure of the level on the caps (in $100,000 increments of 2004 dollars). The second method used dichotomous variables indicating the presence of: a cap less than or equal to $250,000; a cap between $250,000 and $500,000; a cap between $500,000 and $750,000; and a cap amount greater than $750,000.
To put estimates of tort reform into a broader context, we simulated the effects of imposing (or removing) a $250,000 nationwide cap on noneconomic damages, and also the incremental effect of adding caps in states that do not have any-the policy recommendation currently under debate. Malpractice insurance effects were estimated directly for obstetrics/gynecology, internal medicine, and general surgery specialties based on observed premiums from the Medical Liability Monitor. For 16 other specialties, we estimated expected premiums based on malpractice liability derived from the RBRVS. Expected premiums were calculated using a malpractice index based on the top 25 billed procedures for each specialty. The malpractice index for each specialty is the weighted average of malpractice RVUs generated relative to malpractice RVUs generated by internists or general surgeons.
Expected premiums for each specialty physician were then calculated as the product of the malpractice index and the premiums for internists or general surgeons, depending on type of specialty and the area. For example, a thoracic surgeon generates roughly 1.34 times the number of malpractice RVUs as a general surgeon. The average malpractice premium for a general surgeon in Alabama was $31,125 in 2004; thus, we estimated the premium for a thoracic surgeon in Alabama to be $41,716. Finally, we used the distribution of physicians by specialty and state together with our regression estimates of the effects of damage caps to develop simulations of the effect of a national cap on damage awards set at $250,000 and the level of premiums expected if there were no caps.
We tested the validity of these imputed premiums by using RVU weights and premiums for internal medicine to predict general surgery premiums and vice versa. These imputations tend to overestimate medical specialty premiums ($18,311 estimated vs. $13,911 observed) and underestimate surgical specialty premiums ($34,007 estimated vs. $43,217 observed). Thus, approximations made on overall tort reform effects were subject to extensive sensitivity analysis via Monte Carlo simulations. (2004) dollars average malpractice premiums for obstetrics/gynecology (OB/GYN), general surgery, and internal medicine. Premiums were flat or declining in inflation-adjusted terms from 1991 to 1999, then rose at an increasing rate through 2004. Figure 2 shows average 2004 premiums for the six lowestand six highest-cost states. The variability is striking. There is a more than 12-fold difference between the least and most expensive markets. Figure 3 shows 2004 simple average premiums by specialty for states with and without caps on damage awards. States with caps had slightly lower malpractice premiums. Table 4 shows results for tort provisions with log-transformed internal medicine premiums as the dependent variable under different model specifications. Model Ia, including neither state nor year fixed effects, shows the rather implausi- ble result that the adoption of damage caps had no significant effect on premiums, but that higher levels of the cap reduced premiums. The adoption of most of the other tort reforms had no statistically significant effects. Longer statutes of repose (given any in place) were associated with higher premiums, as might be expected; however, provisions for arbitration and restrictions on expert testimony had implausibly large positive coefficients. Similarly, model Ib, treating damages caps as stepped indicators, suggests that only caps set at very high levels have any significant effect. Further, in using the HalversonPalmquist (1980) bias correction for dummy variables in a semi-log specification, the model implies that caps in excess of $750,000 would be expected to lower premiums by about 65% (e À1.039 À 1 ¼ .646). Note that in all text discussions of tort reform dummy variable coefficients, we report the corrected value while leaving the uncorrected coefficients in the tables.
Results

Figure 1 shows trends in constant
Model IIa used state fixed effects and includes the variables for investment returns. The presence of a cap on noneconomic damages reduced premiums, but the effect was not statistically significant. However, given the presence of a damage cap, a higher level of the cap was positively correlated with premiums and was statistically significant. A $100,000 increase in the damage cap raised premiums by 2.8%. The presence of a statute of repose, which essentially provides a maximum period during which a suit may be filed, reduced premiums. Given such a statute, its length was associated with a positive, but not significant, increase in premiums. In contrast, all states have statutes of limitations. These laws limit the time period in which a suit may be filed once a potentially negligent act has occurred or been discovered. The model IIa results suggest longer liability windows implausibly reduce premiums. Similarly, mandatory collateral offsets were positively correlated with malpractice premiums. Finally, there was a strong and highly significant elasticity of À.399 between premiums and the Dow Jones industrial average, and a marginally significant À.202 elasticity with respect to treasury bond prices. There was no statistically significant effect of the Nasdaq index on malpractice premiums. These findings suggest that malpractice premiums do depend, in part, on investment returns, but apparently not on more risky investments.
Model IIb provides similar results. Caps less than $250,000 were associated with lower premiums (bias corrected 36% reduction; p , .10); caps from $250,000 to $500,000 produced less of an effect (bias corrected 16.8% reduction; p , .05); caps from $500,000 to $750,000 had no significant effect; and caps greater than $750,000 were associated with higher premiums (bias corrected 44.8% increase; p , .001). The effects of other tort reforms were similar to those described, except that the positive association between longer periods for statutes of re- pose and higher premiums was now statistically significant.
Models IIIa and IIIb reflect our preferred specification, with fixed effects for both states and years. The introduction of a cap on noneconomic damages reduced medical malpractice premiums by 17.3% (p , .01). A more generous cap raised premiums. A $100,000 higher cap increased pre- miums by 3.9%. Thus a cap of about $440,000 would be expected to have no effect. Model IIIb has a similar interpretation. Caps less than $250,000 were associated with lower premiums (bias corrected 25% reduction; p , .05); caps from $250,000 to $500,000 produced less of an effect (bias corrected 11.5% reduction; p , .10); caps from $500,000 to $750,000 raised pre- miums (bias corrected 7.9% increase; p , .05); and caps greater than $750,000 were associated with still higher premiums (bias corrected 47.8% increase; p , .001).
The other variables remain largely the same as in models IIa and IIb. The results for the length of the statute of limitations and for mandatory collateral offsets continue to be counter intuitive. How- ever, the statute of limitations effect can be traced to a single state, Minnesota, where the statute of limitations increased at a time when malpractice premiums had been falling. The mandatory collateral offsets effect can be traced to three states-Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and West Virginia-all of which introduced the provision when malpractice premiums were rising sharply. It is likely that these measures were simply ineffective rather than actually causing a rise in premiums. No other tort reforms had any statistically significant effects in either model II or III.
Results were similar for regressions using full fixed-effects (log) premium models for other specialties (Tables 5 and 6 ). The introduction of a cap reduced general surgery and obstetrics/ gynecology premiums by 20.7% (p , .01) and 25.5% (p , .001), respectively. An increase in the noneconomic damage cap of $100,000 raised premiums by 3.9% in both specialties (p , .001). Similarly, the stepped indicators in model IIIb shows significant decreases in premiums associated with lower cap levels and increases in premiums associated with higher levels. The other reforms behaved in similar ways to those for internal medicine, with some variables losing significance for one specialty or another.
While the use of fixed effects can control for unobserved state characteristics and period trends, a potential endogeneity problem remains. The primary concern is that states may tend to enact tort reforms in response to increased malpractice premiums. It is important to note, however, that much of the variation in damage caps arose from the effects of inflation, and thus to some extent is exogenous to policy decisions. To test for the presence of endogeneity, we ran a series of regressions with one-, three-, and five-year leads for the presence of caps (Table 7) . The coefficients on these lead variables were not significant either individually or in combination.
Simulation results based upon our fixed-effects specification and applied across all 19 specialties available to us indicate that a national cap of $250,000 for noneconomic damages in all states would imply premium savings of $16.9 billion (95% CI, $14.2 billion to $19.6 billion) relative to no state having a cap. Extending a $250,000 cap to all states currently without them or with caps above this level would save $1.4 billion (95% CI, $.9 billion to $1.75 billion), or about 8% of total premiums.
Discussion
The firmest conclusion that can be drawn from our study is that caps on noneconomic damages can significantly constrain the growth of medical malpractice premiums. First, in our preferred specification, the introduction of a cap lowered internal medicine premiums by over 17.3%, general surgery premiums by 20.7%, and obstetrics/gynecology premiums by 25.5%. Second, an increase of $100,000 in the statutory cap on noneconomic damages increased malpractice premiums by 3.9% for all three specialties. By using the constant dollar value of caps we were able to observe the ''dose response'' both when states introduced or modified caps and when the real value of a cap changed over time as a result of inflation. Our results also indicate that premium growth is constrained when investment returns are higher, particularly for the high quality stocks represented in the Dow Jones industrial average. The effects are less robust for the Nasdaq index and are never significant for bond prices. This makes sense intuitively; when investment returns are high, firms have income over and above collected premiums and would be expected to keep premiums low in a competitive market. However, relaxing the year-level fixed effects, as was necessary for this analysis, means that unobserved factors could be influencing both equity returns and malpractice premiums.
The findings with respect to other tort provisions are less convincing. Imposing a firm statute of repose-a firm time limit for bringing a claim-can reduce premiums by as much as 25%, assuming the period is approximately the five-year average among states with such statutes. In some states, however, statutes of repose have been found unconstitutional. Other attempts at tort reform appear to have no effect on premiums, and some may even be counterproductive. The findings that increasing the length of the statute of limitations decreases premiums and that mandatory collateral source offsets increase premiums appear to be artifacts of the timing of these laws in a small handful of states. It is likely that these measures were simply ineffective rather than causing a rise in premiums. No other tort reforms had any significant effect. An important limitation of this study directly concerns the findings on tort reforms other than damage caps. Because there were no changes in law during our time frame for limits on attorney fees, res ipsa loquitur, and pretrial screening procedures, each of these factors had to be dropped from the analysis. The few changes made in other reforms also were problematic, particularly for collateral source rules, statutes of limitations, limits on expert testimony, and provisions for arbitration of malpractice claims. We attempted to aggregate tort reforms as has been done in other studies (creating an indicator for any indirect reforms in effect), but this aggregate indicator exhibited less change than did many of the individual laws we used in our analyses. It should be noted that studies of time periods when there was greater variation in the laws, due to legislative activity, found no significant effects for most indirect changes in the law compared with directly capping awards.
Another limitation is that the fixed-effects specification only controls for unobserved statelevel characteristics that do not vary over time. Unobserved factors within states that vary over time could bias our estimates. To some extent, this is ameliorated by the year-level fixed effects, which control for unobserved secular characteristics. Therefore, the concern is greater when evaluating the findings for the investment returns that required relaxing the year fixed effects. Some of the null findings with respect to changes in tort law can be attributed to a lack of observed change over time-no states changed their laws with regard to pretrial screening or limits on attorneys' fees during the period studied.
The $1.4 billion annual savings that could be obtained from imposing additional or stricter caps represents 8% of total premiums paid. Those savings would come at the expense of plaintiffs. Policymakers must determine whether the savings in premiums justify imposing those costs. There is, however, evidence that malpractice suits do not correlate well with negligently inflicted harm (Brennan, Sox, and Burstin 1996) . Further research is also needed to determine whether tort reforms can affect other health care costs through the practice of ''defensive'' medicine-where clinically inappropriate tests and procedures are used because of concerns over liability.
